A new scenario for simultaneously generating a secret key and two private keys among three Terminals in the presence of an external eavesdropper is considered. Terminals 1, 2 and 3 intend to share a common secret key concealed from the external eavesdropper (Terminal 4) and simultaneously, each of Terminals 1 and 2 intends to share a private key with Terminal 3 while keeping it concealed from each other and from Terminal 4. All four Terminals observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources and there is a public channel from Terminal 3 to Terminals 1 and 2. An inner bound of the "secret key-private keys capacity region" is derived and the single letter capacity regions are obtained for some special cases.
The broadcasting nature of wireless communication networks leads to easy eavesdropping. Due to this fact, secret key sharing between Terminals is of great importance to provide secure communication. An approach to achieve this goal is based on exploiting correlated sources as common randomness between Terminals and communicating over a public channel.
Communication of confidential message was characterized by Wyner [1] , in which the model of wiretap channel was introduced. Subsequently, Csiszar and Korner in [2] considered the problem of transmitting a confidential message with a common message in a non-degraded discrete memoryless broadcast channel. Sharing a secret key between two Terminals in the presence of an eavesdropper was first investigated by Maurer in [3] and Ahlswede and Csiszar in [4] where the source and the channel common randomness were used to share a secret key between the two Terminals. Csiszar and Narayan in [5] considered the mentioned problem in the presence of a forth node as a helper. Sharing a secret key between more than two Terminals has been explored by several authors such as [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In some other scenarios, it is intended to share multiple secret keys among different groups of Terminals simultaneously. In [11] Ye and Narayan examined the problem of sharing a secret-key and a private-key for three Terminals. They investigated the problem for generating a secret key among three Terminals and simultaneously a designated pair of Terminals generates a private key. They explored the problem at the presence of an eavesdropper who can just wiretap the 1 
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No.88114.46 and also by Iran telecommunication research center (ITRC). communications over the public channel and does not have any other resources to eavesdrop. In [13] Salimi et.al investigated generating two private-keys in a source model consisting of three users. Each of Users 1 and 2 intends to share a private key with User 3 where User 1 acts as a wiretapper for User 2 and vice versa. In their scenario, two situations were investigated based on the direction of public channel.
In this paper, a new scenario is considered for simultaneously sharing one secret key and two private keys. In our scheme, there are four Terminals that observe i.i.d. outputs of distinct correlated sources. Terminals 1, 2 and 3 wish to share a secret key among them which should be effectively concealed from the forth Terminal which acts as an external eavesdropper. Simultaneously, each of Terminals 1 and 2 intends to share a private key with Terminal 3 while keeping it concealed from each other and from the external eavesdropper. There is a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity from Terminal 3 to the other Terminals. Compared to [11] , our work requires different security requirements due to the fact that the external wiretapper is equipped with source observations rather than the public channel observations. Also, sharing two private keys are intended in our work. Beside, compared to [12, 13] , our work necessitates another requirement as sharing a common secret key between the three Terminals and considering an external eavesdropper.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the model and the problem preliminaries are illustrated. In Section III, our main results and the intuition behind them are given. In Section IV, the proofs are provided. Finally, in Section V, the concluding remarks are given. Throughout the paper, the upper case letters indicate random variables and the lower case letters indicate their realizations.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a discrete memoryless multiple sources (DMMS) consisting of four components with alphabets 1 2 3 4 ( , , , ) χ χ χ χ and corresponding generic random variables 1 2 3 4 , , , X X X X . Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, observe n i.i.d. repetitions of the random variables 1 2 3 4 , , , X X X X . Furthermore, a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity is available such that Terminal 3 can broadcast its required information over it. The information sent over the public channel is depicted by 3 F which is a stochastic function of Terminal 3's observation i.e. 3 3 ( )
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The random variables 0 1 2 , , F over the public channel. After receiving 3 F , Terminals 1 and 2 compute the estimation of key pairs 0 1 0 2 ( , ),( , )
K K K K , respectively, as deterministic functions of the information available at each Terminal such that:
Here 0,1 0,2( , ) K K take values from the finite set 0 Κ , and 1 2( , ) K K take values from the finite sets 1 2 , Κ Κ , respectively. Now we define conditions which should be addressed in our key sharing scheme. 
Equations (1) and (2) are the reliability conditions of the keys at Terminals 2 and 3. Equation (3) means that the private keys of Terminals 2 and 3 are effectively hidden from each other. Equation (4) means that all the keys should be kept secret from Terminal 4. Finally the set of equations in (5) (6) indicates the uniformity conditions.
Definition 2:
The region containing all the achievable secret key-private keys rate triple 0 1 2 ( , , ) R R R is the secret keyprivate keys capacity region.
III. STATEMENT OF RESULTS
In this section we state the main results.
Theorem 1: (inner bound)
The following region of nonnegative rate triples is achievable for the described source model:
Q U U U are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution: The above region can be achieved via successive cancellation decoding. For achievability, we use a scheme which utilizes superposition coding as well as double layer binning.
We could not prove that the rate region in (8) is the capacity region in general; however, we have investigated some special cases where the rate region in (8) is the secret key-private keys capacity region. First, we derive an explicit outer bound for the secret key-private keys capacity region, and then we provide some special cases where the region in (8) coincides with the outer bound. ( , , | , ) 
, the secret key-private keys capacity region reduces to (10) , the proof is the same as corollary 1. chain as 3   1 2 4
Corollary 3: When the source observations form a Markov
, the secret key-private keys capacity region reduces to: ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
This situation is illustrated in Fig.2 . When the source observations form a Markov chain as 1
, the secret key-private keys capacity region can be derived by symmetry from Corollary 5. For two remaining Markov chains 3 4 1 2 X X X X − − − and 3 4 2 1 X X X X − − − all the rates will be equal to zero. It can be shown by exploiting the explicit upper bound in (9) .
IV. PROOFS
Due to space limitation, achievability proof and analysis of security conditions are omitted, it can be referred to [15] . In this section converse proof is given.
Converse proof
In this subsection, the converse part of corollary 3 is proved in which the source observations form the Markov chain 
( ; , | , , , , ) ( ; , | , , , 
( ; | , ) ( ; | , ) (2 ) For rate 2 R , it is clear from the Markov chain that every message Terminal 2 decodes can also be decode by Terminal 1. Therefore in this case the private key 2 rate is equal to zero. But still we can prove this claim by noting that in the explicit outer bound we have 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of simultaneous sharing a secret key and two private keys among three Terminals with an additional wiretapper. We obtained an inner bound to the secret key-private keys capacity region. Also for some special cases, we showed that the inner bound is the secret key-private keys capacity region demonstrating that the inner bound is tight. The investigated special cases include all the different Markov chains that the sources can form.
As a generalization of this work, considering the case in which Terminal 3 is not a trusted party, one can study the case of having three private keys in this model. For now, we are working on a case in which the direction of the public channel is reversed; meaning the case in which only Terminals 1 and 2 are allowed to talk over the public channel.
